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The literature on social cognition reports many instances of a phenomenon titled ‘social
projection’ or ‘egocentric bias’. These terms indicate egocentric predictions, i.e., an over-
reliance on the self when predicting the cognition, emotion, or behavior of other people.
The classic method to diagnose egocentric prediction is to establish high correlations
between our own and other people’s cognition, emotion, or behavior. We argue that this
method is incorrect because there is a different way to come to a correlation between own
and predicted states, namely, through the use of theoretical knowledge. Thus, the use of
correlational measures is not sufﬁcient to identify the source of social predictions. Based
on the distinction between simulation theory and theory theory, we propose the following
alternative methods for inferring prediction strategies: independent vs. juxtaposed
predictions, the use of ‘hot’ mental processes, and the use of participants’ self-reports.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd.Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
How do we come to know about the mental states
(e.g., beliefs, or desires) that are existing in ourselves? One
inﬂuential philosophical view suggests that we know about
our own current mental states through introspection. Des-
cartes argued that we are in doubt about everything except
what is happening in our own mind. This view came under
attack by Ryle (1949) and Wittgenstein (1958), who
proposed a radically different view. These philosophers
maintained that there is nothing like beliefs or desires in the
mind and that mental terms refer to dispositions to behave
in certain ways rather than to internal mental states. Simi-
larly, Sellars (1956) argued against introspection and
proposed, as an alternative, that lay people have a theory of
mind that positsmental states. The present paper dealswith; fax: þ43 662 8044
C. Bazinger), anton.
26.
BY-NC-ND license.a similar question for the topic of other minds: How do we
come to know about the mental states that exist in other
people?Wewill discuss the merits of a distinction between
simulation theory and theory theory for understanding and
predicting the behavior of other people. Speciﬁcally, wewill
show that this distinction can be used in research on social
cognition in order to better explain the bases of under-
standing and predicting other minds.
Imagine the following experiment: You ask people to
rate T-shirts of different colors on a scale from 1 to 10
according to their liking. Then you ask them to make
predictions for another person, using the same scale. How
can people accomplish this task? They can either project
their own judgment onto others, i.e., they use their own
opinion as a basis for the prediction (the strategy of using
‘self as proxy’), or they can base their predictions on folk
psychological theories about other people (e.g., what colors
are popular among people in general). Consider the result
of the hypothetical experiment to be a mean correlation of
r¼þ0.40 between own and predicted liking. What does
this result mean? Did participants make their predictions
using a theory or the self as proxy?
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interpret such ﬁndings as indicating social projection, i.e.,
using the self as a proxy. The logic for this interpretation is
that social projection will result in a correlation between
own and predicted preference. Although true in general,
this interpretation faces two problems: First, the use of
a theory can also lead to signiﬁcant correlations, if that
theory happens to produce a prediction similar to one’s
own judgment. Second, social projection is tested against
the null hypothesis of no correlation; a proper test of social
projection should be against a correlation of 1, however,
given that complete social projection implies a perfect
correlation. We argue that correlations by themselves do
not show that predictions are based on the self, i.e., they do
not show social projection. Instead of relying on correla-
tions, alternative methods are needed to determine
whether people use the self or theoretical knowledge for
predictions.
2. Predicting others
Predicting other people’s behavior is one of the essential
requirements of our daily lives. Knowingwhat other people
think or feel and what they therefore might do, makes our
social lives easier and allows us to maneuver smoothly
through the world that we share with others. Although we
are generally successful in our predictions of others (which
is evident since we are not constantly surprised by the
behavior of people around us), sometimes predictions go
wrong. One particular error that is attributed to people is
the tendency to ﬁnd others more similar to themselves
than they actually are (e.g., Dawes, 1989; Gilovich, Jennings,
& Jennings, 1983). People tend to believe that other people
will act, think and feel as they do. This assumption is true
on a very basic level, since we are all human, hardwired in
a similar way, and, unless suffering from a severe mental
disorder, our way of thinking and feeling is therefore
similar. However, it is certainly not wise to over-apply this
idea. The erroneous assumption that we can automatically
derive other people’s experience from our own experience
has been discussed by philosophers (e.g., Gregory, 2004).
Turing reminded us that, although we may perceive
someone as human and therefore similar to ourselves, he
could also be a computer trying to deceive us (as explicated
in the famous ‘Turing Test’). The basic philosophical issue of
the idea of likeness notwithstanding, social psychology has
also collected evidence of overgeneralization. Indeed,
people are psychologically different in many aspectsdour
opinions, beliefs, ideals, morals, and preferences need not
be the same. At times, people realize this and do not
assume that other people will behave similarly to them-
selves (e.g., Johnson, 1987; Karniol, Eylon, & Rish, 1997).
However, research has documented many instances of
over-application of similarity (e.g., the false consensus
effect; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). This phenomenon is
called ‘social projection’, where the basis for predicting
others (a social task) is our own judgment projected onto
othersda strategy that can be described as using oneself as
proxy. However, there is a real alternative to projection:
The use of purely theoretical information that can also be
the basis for predicting other people. For instance, onecould use speciﬁc knowledge about a good friend, or
knowledge about how other people in general would react.
These two polesdprojection and theorydcontrast in the
amount to which the self is involved: High in the case of
projection, not necessarily in the case of a theory. In
philosophy of mind, these two concepts are known as
simulation theory (Gordon, 1986; Heal, 1986) and theory
theory (Churchland, 1981; Fodor, 1987). Even though
concepts related to simulation and theory are used in social
psychology (Ames, 2004a, 2004b; Epley, Keysar, Van Boven,
& Gilovich, 2004), we argue that current theorizing does
not adequately distinguish between theory and simulation.
Before we go into detail about the methodological prob-
lems, we will introduce simulation theory and theory
theory.3. Simulation theory and theory theory
Simulation theory was introduced by philosophers
(Gordon, 1986; Heal, 1986) as an explanation for our ability
to understand and predict other people. It holds that we
use ourselves as a model for understanding and predicting
other people, in a process that does not require any
knowledge about the mental makeup of other people.
Simulation theory claims that the same sequence of mental
processes that can be found in another person also takes
place in us, triggered by the imagined situation. This
replication of mental processes (Heal, 1986) is the core
assumption of simulation theory. Perner and Brandl (2009,
p. 438) distinguish three stages of simulation:
(i) Identiﬁcation: We pretend to be in the other person’s
situation.
(ii) Replication: Our own mental processes work in the
same way as those of the other person.
(iii) Interpretation: Themental states that were involved in
the replication stage are extracted and are projected
onto the other person.
Simulation is a simple method for using the self as a tool
for predicting other people, and it has been shown that it is
used as a strategy for predictions (Kühberger, Kogler, Hug,
& Mösl, 2006; Perner & Kühberger, 2003).
The counterpart to the simulation view is theory theory
(Churchland, 1981; Fodor, 1987), which states that we
possess folk psychological theories about mental processes.
Other people’s behavior is accordingly explained and pre-
dicted by ascribing beliefs, desires and other mental states
to them. Explanation and prediction of other people’s
behavior exploit an internally represented knowledge
structure of human behavior, i.e., a ‘folk psychology’ (Stich
& Nichols, 1992). Folk psychology, in its broadest sense,
contains information about how the human mind works
and how that makes people act in different situations. We
possess concepts about different mental states, their rela-
tionships among each other and about the relationship
betweenmental states and behavior (e.g., that people act to
satisfy their desires according to their beliefs; Apperly,
2008). Folk psychology helps us to reconstruct what goes
on in other minds and allows us to describe, explain and
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2006). In contrast to simulation theory, we do not relive
the other person’s mental states, but rather exploit
knowledge about other people and their mental workings.
To arrive at social predictions, we use our theories of how
people’s mental states interact with each other to generate
behavior, and we combine these theories with any addi-
tional initial theoretical knowledge that wemay have about
the target person (Apperly, 2008). Although most theory
theorists consider our ability to understand and predict
other people as realized through commonsense psycho-
logical theories, there are different versions of theory
theory. For example, there is debate about what exactly
constitutes these theoriesdwhile some see a ‘theory’ in
a network of different beliefs, assumptions, and platitudes
about the mental domain (Stich & Nichols, 1998), others
claim that folk psychology should show the characteristics
of a real scientiﬁc theory (Gopnik &Meltzoff, 1997). Further,
it has been suggested that there are innate modules in our
brain that are speciﬁcally designed for the understanding of
other minds (e.g., Leslie, 1987). Nevertheless, the basic idea
of all versions of theory theory is that we employ theo-
retical knowledge to arrive at social predictions.
It is also reasonable to assume that we sometimes use
both simulation and theory, as hybrid models suggest
(e.g., Epley et al., 2004). This integration allows adaption to
different target people and situations. Theoretical infor-
mation can be added before (upstream) or after (down-
stream) the simulation process (Stich & Nichols, 1997).
3.1. Simulation, theory, and social psychology
The basic distinction between simulation and theory
has made its way into social psychology. Epley et al. (2004)
integrated the concepts of simulation and theory in an
anchoring and adjustment model. The model proposes
that we rely heavily on the self when predicting others,
but try to adjust from our perspective with theoretical
information. This model can be viewed as a hybrid of
simulation and theory: “Our results suggest that by
adulthood, individuals’ attempts at perspective taking are
often something of an integration of theory and simula-
tion” (Epley et al., 2004, p. 338). Similarly, Ames (2005)
distinguishes between ‘stereotyping’ and ‘projecting’ as
the major strategies that people rely on when predicting
othersdprocesses that are similar to theory and simula-
tion. Even though those ideas are analogous to the
dichotomy of theory and simulation, they do not make the
original concepts redundant, since the philosophical
concepts are more elaborated theoretical positions. For
example, Ames (2004a, 2004b) considers ‘stereotyping’ as
one of two prediction strategies, equating stereotyping
with theory theory. However, stereotypes are only one
way to use theoretical information. Another possibility is
using speciﬁc information about other, often well-known
people, which has nothing to do with stereotypes. In
a social-cognitive variant of theory theory, the self-as-
distinct (SAD) model (Karniol, 2003) proposes that we
do not use the self as the basis for predicting other people,
as self-knowledge has no special status, but is merely
deﬁned in terms of its distinctiveness from prototypicalsocial knowledge. Rather, social predictions are based on
generic representations of prototypical others. Only if the
target person deviates from this default, idiosyncratic
representations are used instead. Thus, there are various
similar models that combine theory and simulation, which
differ with respect to what is the primary source of
information.
How do we determine whether theory or simulation
was used? One possible method is to consider the factors
that lead to either one of the two strategies. Features
such as familiarity (Krienen, Tu, & Buckner, 2010;
Nickerson, 1999), similarity (Ames, 2004b; Ames, Weber,
& Zou, 2011; Jones, 2004b; Pollmann, Finkenauer, & van
Djik, 2008) or the sense of being unique (Karniol,
2003) have been discussed. As we will show, there is
a problem with most of the research investigating the
theory-simulation issue, since most of the studies rely on
correlations. The use of correlations, however, does not
allow for unambiguous interpretation of these ﬁndings.
4. Ways of social projection
Although projection has different meanings in
psychology (see Holmes, 1968, for a review), for the
purposes of the current paper, social projection is deﬁned
as “(.) assigning a state of one’s own to someone else“
(Goldman, 2006, p. 40). The assumption that other people
will act, feel or decide the same way as we do is the basic
idea of social projection. Katz and Allport (1931) coined this
term after noticing that the more students admitted having
cheated on exams, the more they expected other students
having cheated as well. Different labels for this process are
attributive projection (Holmes, 1968), egocentric attribution
(Heider, 1958), egocentric bias (Epley et al., 2004), assumed
similarity (Cronbach, 1955), and, most famously, false
consensus effect (Ross et al., 1977).4.1. Measurement of social projection
Social projection seems to occur in various kinds of
situations, including predictions about personality traits
(Krueger & Clement, 1994; Krueger & Zeiger, 1993), atti-
tudes (Biernat, Manis, & Kobrynowicz, 1997), feelings (Van
Boven & Loewenstein, 2003), and decisions (Ross et al.,
1977; Van Boven, Loewenstein, & Dunning, 2005). The
people whose reactions are being predicted also vary
greatly: In some studies, speciﬁc individuals are the targets
of prediction (Bender & Hastorf, 1950; Pollmann et al.,
2008). These individuals vary in familiaritydsometimes,
the prediction is made for awell-known other, like a spouse
(Davis, Hoch, & Easton Ragsdale, 1986); in many studies it is
a stranger whose reaction has to be predicted (Van Boven
et al., 2005). Sometimes, a prediction about people in
general is required (Clement & Krueger, 2000; Krueger &
Clement, 1994; Krueger & Zeiger, 1993). Participants also
have to estimate reactions of groups of people (de la Haye,
2000; Krueger & Stanke, 2001; Monin & Norton, 2003),
with the predictor being part of the group that has to be
predicted (Biernat et al., 1997; Dawes & Mulford, 1996), or
not (Clement & Krueger, 2002; Monin & Norton, 2003).
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basic methodological approaches. One approach is the false
consensus paradigm (e.g., Ross et al., 1977), in which
participants indicate their own answer to a dichotomous
question (yes/no; agree/disagree) and are then asked what
percentage of other people would respond in one way or
another. If people who endorse an item think that most
other peoplewould do the same, the conclusion is that they
have fallen prey to the bias. The other approach is the
assumed similarity paradigm (e.g., Cronbach, 1955) which
requires participants to indicate their own answer along
a particular dimension and then to estimate the position of
another (individual) person. Thus, the false consensus
paradigm focuses on frequencies (i.e., estimation of
percentages) in a group, while the assumed similarity
paradigm focuses on central tendencies and the prediction
of individual people (Jones, 2004a).
4.1.1. The false consensus effect
False consensus (Ross et al., 1977) means that we over-
estimate the similarity between ourselves and others and
therefore think that our own beliefs, opinions, and deci-
sions are very commondin other words, people tend to
project their own subjective experience and action
tendencies onto others. In the paradigmatic study (Ross
et al., 1977), students were asked whether they would
wear a sandwich board around campus that read ‘Repent’.
The students who agreed to do this thought that most other
students would do the same, but those who refused stated
most would not do that. Countless studies on this
phenomenon have been conducted since, and while some
of them considered it as being due to a false consensus (see
also Mullen et al., 1985, for a meta-analysis), others used
the more neutral term social projection, underscoring its
source, (i.e., that people rely on the similarity between
themselves and others) rather than its evaluation (i.e., that
they overestimate similarity, which leads to a bias).
Over the years, research has come up with several
explanations for the false consensus effect (cf. Marks &
Miller, 1987). Most of them were interpreting the
phenomenon as some kind of bias, resulting from selective
exposure (Ross et al., 1977), cognitive availability (Marks &
Miller, 1985, 1987; Ross et al., 1977); causal attribution
(Gilovich et al., 1983; Ross, 1977), motivational factorsTable 1
Sample of social projection studies with main characteristics and ﬁndings.
Study Target of prediction T
Bender and Hastorf (1950) Class members P
Clement and Krueger (2000) Majority of people T
Dawes and Mulford (1996) Students C
de la Haye (2000) Students P
Hoch (1987) Average consumer, peer, spouse A
Krueger and Clement (1994) General population M
Krueger and Zeiger (1993) General population (men & women) M
Monin and Norton (2003) Students Q
Pollmann et al. (2008) Similar person (average student,
average Dutch person)
S
Note. AS¼Assumed similarity method, FC¼ False consensus method, CPI¼ Califo
Inventory.
a Correlations between own judgment and the prediction for others. For multi
target people.(Marks & Miller, 1987; Ross et al., 1977), or differential
construal (Gilovich, 1990; see also Marks & Miller, 1985, for
a detailed overview). However, even within the bias view,
it has been acknowledged that sometimes the only
information available about people’s reactions or behavior
is the information that the individual holds about himself,
therefore “many times one’s own reactions may be the best
basis for predicting others” (Davis et al., 1986, p. 35). Hence,
the strategy of using the self to make predictions about
others is reasonable (Hoch, 1987), but adjustments are
needed to avoid egocentric errors (Epley et al., 2004).
Taken together, studies about social projection vary
greatly by investigating different target behavior (e.g.,
personality, opinions, feelings, decisions), different
measures of projection (consensus vs. similarity), and
different targets of prediction, either groups (participant as
member or non-member) or individuals (strangers or well-
known others). For illustrative purposes, a sample of the
results is presented in Table 1, organized by target of
prediction, topic of prediction, and paradigm.
The original notion of social projection probably has
implied a process similar to simulation in that the indi-
vidual’s own states are projected onto the other person, as
opposed to just ascribing knowledge (which has nothing to
do with the individual’s own position). Current methods in
the ﬁeld of social projection research, however, fail to
identify whether social projection stems from simulation
or from theory. If the phenomenon of ‘social projection’ is
the result of theory use, then it is not a bias people fall prey
to because they overestimate the similarity between the
self and others, but use of knowledge about humans in
general that does not necessarily have anything to do with
the self. Therefore, proper understanding of this phenom-
enon is impossible without clariﬁcation of the basis for
predictions.
4.2. The interpretation of correlation: measurement issues
The assumption that other people’s actions, opinions, or
thoughts are related to one’s own translates into a signiﬁ-
cant positive correlation between these two measures.
Thus, the royal road for showing social projection is to
measure the correlation between one’s own position and
the prediction of other people’s position (Dawes, 1989;opic of prediction Paradigm Resulta
ersonality characteristics AS r¼ 0.55, r¼ 0.71
rait adjectives AS r¼ 0.24
PI AS r¼ 0.59
ersonal statements FC r¼ 0.30, r¼ 0.34
ttitude statements FC/AS r¼ 0.26, r¼ 0.47, r¼ 0.52
MPI FC r¼ 0.35
MPI FC r¼ 0.45, r¼ 0.47
uestionnaire AS r¼ 0.28, r¼ 0.34
cenarios AS r¼ 0.74, r¼ 0.94
rnia Psychological Inventory, MMPI¼Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
ple results, projection was measured on various occasions, or for different
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seems reasonable, but has several problems: First, how
strong should a correlation be to indicate social projection?
Indeed, as can be seen in Table 1, the size of the reported
relationship varies greatly, and any signiﬁcant positive
correlation between a predictor’s opinion and prediction,
no matter how small, can be interpreted as social projec-
tion. Moreover, although the range of correlations is wide,
the interpretation is always the same: Social projection.
However, unless we can account for the error, a signiﬁcant
difference between correlations calls for an explanation. As
it stands now, any signiﬁcant correlation means the same
thingdif it is only different from zero. What is needed is an
error theory, telling us why correlations are high or not, or
at least an idea on how big a correlation should be in order
to indicate social projection.
In an attempt to get an idea about the size of error in
a typical prediction task, we had participants predict
themselves, since predicting oneself is a relatively error-
free projection task. Thus, in order to gauge the consis-
tency of self-projection, we asked 19 undergraduates to
rate the pleasantness of stimuli (colors and surfaces) on
a scale from 5 ‘very unpleasant’ to þ5 ‘very pleasant’.
Then, we asked one group of participants to rate the same
stimuli assuming that the experiment would take place on
the next day, and the other group to rate stimuli assuming
that the experiment would have taken place the day before.
This scenariod‘prediction’ of self in a very similar sit-
uationdis a setting inwhich the current self is the basis for
prediction and therefore, this task constitutes projection in
its purest form. The mean correlations between judgments
and predictions are presented in Table 2. These correlations
are clearly higher than the correlations found in most
studies on social projection (see Table 1). Taking these
correlations as benchmarks, we would expect that social
projection is indicated by correlation coefﬁcients around
r¼ 0.80. What, then, is the justiﬁcation for an r of 0.40 as
indicating the same process, given that, statistically
speaking, there is a signiﬁcant difference between these
correlations? It is unclear whether this variation in corre-
lation size is only a variation around a ﬁxed effect indi-
cating the same process, or a variation that indicates
different processes.
A second concern is that social projection studies test
against an utterly unrealistic null hypothesis, namely, that
people predict the behavior of others randomly. This
translates into a zero correlation. However, it would be an
utter catastrophe if people were that bad at social predic-
tions. This is surely not the correct alternative to social
projection. Rather, the alternative is that there must be
another source for successful prediction. Indeed, there isTable 2
Correlations between own actual judgment and ‘prediction’ for similar
situation.
Futurea Pastb
Stimulus r (SDr) r (SDr)
Color 0.85 (0.60) 0.91 (0.40)
Surface 0.83 (0.50) 0.87 (0.52)
a n¼ 9.
b n¼ 10.such a source: That people predict on the basis of rules
about behavior, i.e., on the basis of folk psychology. This has
nothing to do with social projection, but it can lead to
results similar to those described in studies. A correct
theory would also lead to a high correlation, even if no
projection was going on. Take the following example:
Imagine being asked what you would like to eat: Carrion or
an apple? Surely, your answerwould be that youwould like
to have the apple. Then you are asked what another person
would prefer. Your correct prediction is that the other
person would also prefer the apple. If we ran an experi-
ment, we would end up with a perfect positive correlation
between own and predicted choice. So does this imply that
this is a case of social projection? No, since the predictions
are based on general knowledge, namely that humans
normally do not eat carrion. Thus, one general rule is
applied to both the individual’s own behavior and the
behavior of others. No social projection is necessary at all. If
the majority of people prefers apples over carrion and
a majority also predicts that people prefer apples over
carrion, this is simply a correct prediction which translates
into a positive correlation between own and predicted
behavior. This example shows that a correlation between
a judgment and a prediction is not enough to constitute
a case of social projection. A theory can lead to the exact
same result. The use of correlational values alonedor
related measures like discrepancy between our own judg-
ment and prediction (Tamir & Mitchell, 2010)dis not
informative, because an alternative to social projection is
always possible, namely, theoretical knowledge. Thus,
a decision between these alternatives cannot be based on
a correlation, but instead, we need to rely on other methods
that are based on the difference between simulation and
theory.
5. Methods for deciding between simulation and
theory
A newapproach is needed to decide between simulation
and theory use. As described above, correlational values are
not sufﬁcient, since theory as well as simulation can lead to
very high and also to low correlations. However, alternative
approaches are possible; some of these approaches have
been already established, others need to be explored.
5.1. Juxtaposed vs. independent predictions
Perner, Gschaider, Kühberger, and Schrofner (1999)
have developed a method that focuses on contrasting
a pair of situations that lead to a target effect, for example,
the framing effect: This effect describes the tendency for
risk-aversion if a problem is framed in terms of gains, and
the tendency for risk-seeking if the same problem is framed
in terms of losses, for example, if 600 people are at stake,
saving 200 (a gain of 200) is equivalent to having 400 die
(a loss of 400) (Tversky & Kahneman,1981). Participants are
asked to make predictions under two different conditions.
One group of participants predicts for both situations
(juxtaposed predictions), and two other groups predict for
only one of the two situations (independent predictions). In
the context of the framing effect, this means that under
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both the positively and the negatively framed situation, but
under independent prediction, participants make a predic-
tion only for either the positively or the negatively framed
condition. The idea is that prediction by simulation is
disturbed by juxtaposing the two situations, as one has to
set aside relevant information from the other situation,
which is hard to do. If predictions are made by simulation,
then the predictions made under independent presenta-
tion of the situations should be more accurate than the
predictions made under juxtaposed presentation. In
contrast, juxtaposition of the situations highlights the
relevant difference between the two situations and makes
application of a theory easier. In short, juxtaposition makes
theory application easy and simulation difﬁcult, and inde-
pendent presentation is optimal for simulation, but is
intransparent with respect to an adequate theory. Hence, if
predictions made under juxtaposed presentation are more
accurate than predictions made under independent
presentation, this indicates use of theory, and when
predictions are more accurate under independent presen-
tation, this indicates use of simulation. With this method,
a series of consistent ﬁndings has been reported indicating
that participants do use simulation for some predictions
and a theory for others (Perner et al., 1999; Perner &
Kühberger, 2003). For example, the framing effect is best
predicted if situations are presented independently, indi-
cating simulation (Perner & Kühberger, 2002).
This method is useful, but not foolproof. First, a reliable
target effect is necessary. Second, in order to decide
whether simulation or theory is used, the juxtaposed and
independent predictions need to lead to different predic-
tions. Third, since the differences in presentationmode also
have an inﬂuence on other features beyond simulation or
theory, the ﬁndings could have an alternative interpreta-
tion. Thus, only a series of studies resulting in a consistent
pattern of ﬁndings can be meaningfully interpreted.
5.2. Simulation is hot
If I am predicting the feelings of another person in
a speciﬁc situation on the basis of simulation, I actually
have to feel the same feelings as the target persondthe
process is the same in me as it is in the other person
(Goldman, 1989). This quality of simulationdthat it is
‘hot’dcan be used for deciding whether people use simu-
lation. Hot simulation can be assessed by asking people
about their emotions or by taking physiological measures
that indicate their current emotions: blushing, sweating
palms, etc. (LeBar, 2001). For example, consider the ‘hot-
cold empathy gap’ (Loewenstein, 1996). This is the ﬁnding
of an interference of people’s current (visceral) states with
their predictions; we misjudge how much we are (or will
be) inﬂuenced by our visceral states. Thus, when predicting
other people who are in different visceral states, we have
a hard time ignoring our current situation and arousal;
rather, we tend to project those states onto others, such
that our own emotions (Van Boven et al., 2005), bodily
drives (Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003), or valuation of
objects (Van Boven, Dunning, & Loewenstein, 2000)
contaminate our predictions of others. This inﬂuence ofone’s own condition on the prediction indicates simulation,
as this contamination of the social prediction by one’s own
states cannot be easily explained by theory. Therefore,
measuring whether current states have been projected
onto social predictions is a useful method for deciding
between theory and simulation.
5.3. Explicit verbal report
One obvious way to determine whether people use
simulation or theory is by directly asking them. However,
Nisbett andWilson (1977) argued in their inﬂuential article
that people cannot properly report their own mental
processes. If this was true, participants’ answers and their
actual behavior may differ. However, Nisbett and Wilson’s
claim has been criticized for being too strong, as it seems
that people are able to report on mental processes in many
situations (Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Smith & Miller, 1978).
So despite that criticism, participants’ self-reports can be
a valid source of evidence, especially if they are combined
with corroborating methods. For instance, Krienen et al.
(2010) asked participants whether they based social
predictions on speciﬁc information or on the self, and
showed that participants reported different strategies
depending on the familiarity of the target person.
In another study (Bazinger & Kühberger, submitted for
publication), participants made a simple social prediction
(color or food preference). After performing the prediction,
participants were asked how they had arrived at this
prediction, using items that probed for subprocesses of
theory and simulation. Speciﬁcally, they were asked about
use of general knowledge about people, that is, a ‘folk
psychology’, which contains (naïve) knowledge about how
psychological processes typically work (Gordon & Cruz,
2002), as well as about use of speciﬁc knowledge about
the target person (i.e., idiosnycratic information about
another person, which might be applicable to this speciﬁc
person only and that cannot be generalized to other
people). The latter information is a form of evidence since it
stems from directly interacting with one speciﬁc individual,
from observation, or from being told by other people (Frith
& Frith, 2006). In addition, participants indicated whether
they had used what according to Perner and Brandl’s
(2009) model constitutes simulation: Imagining the situa-
tion of the other person (‘perspective taking’), and simu-
lating the other person with one’s own mind (replication,
or using ‘self as proxy’), and ascribing the outcome of one’s
own mental process to the other person.
The results showed that participants had a pretty good
intuition about the strategies they had used for arriving at
their predictions. Thus, the verbal report can be a valuable
method for distinguishing whether simulation or theory
was used (Bazinger & Kühberger, submitted for
publication). Verbal self-reports can provide information
about the prediction process that would be overlooked
with conventional methods (e.g., correlations). For
example, participants reported using both simulation and
theory in their predictions, which would not have been
obvious when just looking at correlations. Further, different
aspects of simulation and theory were used, depending on
characteristics of the other person (e.g., general knowledge
C. Bazinger, A. Kühberger / New Ideas in Psychology 30 (2012) 328–335334was used for unknown others, but speciﬁc knowledge for
well-known others), which is also not evident when
focusing on correlations alone. In addition, participants’
self-reports were sound, for example, the more they
reported using ‘self as proxy’ as prediction strategy, the
higher was the likelihood that the prediction would match
their own choice. Therefore, this method can differentiate
between simulation and theory, despite the obvious
drawbacks of self-reports, and can provide useful infor-
mation about the prediction process that would otherwise
be overlooked.
6. Conclusion
The strategy of assuming that other peoplewould do the
same as oneself seems to be a good idea in many situations
(Ames et al., 2011), and therefore, using the self as a proxy
(i.e., social projection) may frequently be adopted as
a prediction strategy. It seems, however, that there are
cases that include theoretical information. Thus, the term
‘projection’ should be used carefully, as it may not always
be the case that projection onto others really takes place.
Calculating correlations between own position and pre-
dicted position has been used as the royal road to infer
social projection. This is a problem, however, since corre-
lations varying widely in size have been interpreted as
indicating the same process. A strong correlation between
people’s own answers and their predictions for others is
probably necessary for establishing social projection, but
not sufﬁcient, since theory can also lead to strong correla-
tions. On the other hand, a weak correlation between these
two measures raises serious doubts about whether simu-
lation is really existent in the case at hand, or whether it is
mainly the use of different theories that leads to this low
correlation (as theory can account for both high and low
correlations).
We suggest that future research should concentrate on
alternative approaches for deciding between simulation
and theory. The method by Perner et al. (1999) is a good
start and has been successfully applied. Another alternative
approach is to exploit one of the essential characteristics of
simulation theory: That the same process takes place in the
target person as well as in the predicting person. Stages of
this process can be investigated using self-reportsdﬁrst
attempts have already shown that this method is indeed
valid.Acknowledgment
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